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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20000532-CA

vs.
MARC W. SCHUMACHER,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from one conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol,
in violation of Utah Code Ann §41-6-44. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did Officer Russell lawfully detain the Defendant, when the reasonable suspicion
that the stop was based on was provided to him by Agent Dunlap who had
observed the defendant run a stop sign?
"An investigative stop may survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of

unreasonable searches and seizures if performed by an officer who objectively relies on
information, bulletins, or flyers received from other law enforcement sources." United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682, 83 L.Ed. 2d. 604 (1985).

1

Furthermore, an officer may rely on an informant's tip for his reasoning to stop a
defendant. Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, and statutes are relevant to this appeal:
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. $77-7-15
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-72.10(b)
Except when directed to proceed by a peace officer, every operator of a
vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but
if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection,
but if none, then at a point nearest the intersecting roadway where the
operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway
before entering it. After having stopped, the operator shall yield the rightof-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time
when the operator is moving across or within the intersection or junction of
roadways. The operator shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians within an
adjacent crosswalk.
Utah Code Ann. $41-6-120)
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor,
2

unless otherwise provided.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information on June 15, 2001, with Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol and Open Container in a Vehicle. The defendant filed an Amended
Motion for Hearing to Establish Probable Cause/Reasonable Suspicion and Motion for
Temporary Injunction (essentially a Motion to Suppress) on September 6, 2001. The
State filed an objection thereto on October 10, 2001. An evidentiary hearing on the
matter was held on October 29, 2001 at which time both the State and the defendant
presented evidence and oral argument. On the 29th of November, 2001, Judge J. Philip
Eves issued his Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, thereby entering his factual
findings in support of his decision to deny the defendant's motion. On April 22, 2002,
the defendant entered a guilty plea to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B
Misdemeanor upon condition that he could appeal Judge Eves' ruling on the suppression
issues.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
The evidence demonstrates that at around 9:00 p.m. on May 26, 2001, the police

]

The Statement of Facts is cited as found by Judge J. Philip Eves in his Findings
of Fact as set forth in the trial court's Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. On
appeal, the defendant did not challenge the trial court's factual findings underlying its
decision. Therefore, the State will not address the sufficiency or accuracy of the trial
court's findings of fact, but will cite to the transcript of the suppression hearing to
support the trial court's findings.
3

dispatcher in Cedar City, Utah, put out a call for officers in investigate a suspicious
vehicle, an older green pickup truck that had been parked in the parking lot at the
Cinema 8 Theaters in Cedar City since around 3:00 p.m. that day. (Transcript of
Suppression Hearing, at 17:15; 18:3). Agent Brent Dunlap, of the Bureau of Criminal
Investigation was just exiting Interstate 15, about lA mile away from the Cinema 8
Theaters, when he heard the broadcast and responded. (T. at 18: 10)
As Agent Dunlap arrived at the Cinema 8 parking lot, he observed an older green
pickup truck parked with its hood up. (T. at 18:16). Before he could reach the
Defendant's vehicle, Agent Dunlap saw Defendant shut the hood of the pickup truck, get
in, and drive off, exiting the parking lot northbound onto Sage Drive. (T. at 19:1).
Agent Dunlap testified that he followed the Defendant, who appeared to be traveling
fairly quickly, onto Sage Drive. (T. at 20:14). Agent Dunlap was unable to "get a
speed" for Defendant. (T. at 20:14). Agent Dunlap testified that as he followed
Defendant on Sage Drive, and at the intersection with 600 South, the Defendant turned
right onto 600 South (eastbound) without making a full stop at the stop sign at the
intersection. (T. at 19:18).
Officer Mike Russell of the Cedar City Police Department was also responding to
the suspicious vehicle broadcast at about the same time. He was approaching westbound
on 600 South, moving in the direction of Defendant, the Cinema 8 Theaters, and Agent
Dunlap. (T. at 20: 4). Officer Russell testified that Agent Dunlap advised him by radio
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that the Defendant had not stopped at the stop sign. (T. at 9:1) Around 500 West and
600 South, Officer Russell encountered the Defendant's vehicle eastbound with Agent
Dunlap behind it. (T. at 20: 6). Officer Russell made a U-turn, got behind Defendant,
and activated his overhead lights. (T. at 20: 6). The Defendant pulled to the curb,
Officer Russell stopped right behind him and Agent Dunlap parked his vehicle behind
Officer Russell's within a few seconds. (T. at 25: 22).
Once at Defendant's vehicle, Officer Russell detected the odor of alcohol on
Defendant's breath, and ultimately, the Defendant was charged with Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol and Open Container.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's motion to suppress is based on the proposition that the stop was
illegal because the officer who stopped him, Officer Russell, did not personally observed
Defendant run the stop sign, thereby negating reasonable suspicion.
Notwithstanding, defendant's proposition, because Agent Dunlap had sufficient
reasonable suspicion for a stop, based on the fact that he witnessed Defendant commit a
criminal violation (running the stop sign), and communicated that lawful basis for a
vehicle stop to Officer Russell, the resulting stop by Officer Russell was lawful.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE REPORTING OFFICER, AGENT DUNLAP, HAD SUFFICIENT
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE DEFENDANT, THEREBY,
ALLOWING OFFICER RUSSELL TO LAWFULLY DETAIN THE
DEFENDANT.
Because Agent Dunlap had sufficient reasonable suspicion for a stop, based on the

fact that he witnessed Defendant commit an offense (running the stop sign), and he
communicated that lawful basis for a vehicle stop to Officer Russell, the resulting stop by
Officer Russell was lawful.
A similar situation was addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Case,
884 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). In that case, University of Utah Police stopped a
vehicle based on a radio broadcast that they received from dispatch of a suspicious
vehicle, and a possible car burglary. Id. at 1275. During the course of the stop, the
officer detected the odor of alcohol, and ultimately the driver was arrested for driving
while under the influence of alcohol. Id. The defendant there also sought to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the stop was illegal because the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to initiate a stop. Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, and suppressed the seized
evidence for the reason that the broadcast was not based on information in possession of
the dispatcher, or anyone else in the law enforcement agency, that created a reasonable
suspicion justifying the stop. Id.
The law is clear that the stopping of a motor vehicle invokes protections of
6

Constitutional magnitude. As the Case Court stated:
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 'seizure9
within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments, even
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite
brief.55 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Accord, State v.
Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App. 1992). See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1,16 (1968) (defining Fourth Amendment seizure as "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away55). Case MA P.2d at 1276.
The requirements for a Terry investigatory stop are codified in Utah Code
Ann. §§ 77-7-15 (1990), which authorizes law enforcement personnel to
"stop any person in a public place when [the officer] has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address
and an explanation of his actions."Id. n2.
Thus, the law is clear that an officer may make a stop of a person or a vehicle
when an offense is committed in his presence. The question raised by the Defendant in
the present case is whether the officer actually making the stop is allowed to rely on
information provided by another officer who has reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.
Defendant argues that because Officer Russell did not personally witness the stop sign
offense, he lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
The Court in Case defined a narrow range of circumstances where an officer may
rely on information from others to provide sufficient reasonable suspicion for a stop.
An investigative stop may survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures if performed by an officer who
objectively relies on information, bulletins, or flyers received from other
law enforcement sources. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105
S. Ct 675, 682, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985). Accord, State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d
646, 650 (Utah 1989); State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah App.), cert.
1

denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
The Hensley decision is a landmark case which added an important
clarification to the Terry investigatory stop doctrine. In Hensley, officers
from the Covington, Kentucky, police department stopped the defendant
based on a "wanted flyer," received via teletype from the St. Bernard, Ohio,
police department, describing the defendant's alleged involvement in an
armed robbery. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 223. The Supreme Court first ruled
that a Terry stop is not limited to investigation of ongoing or future crimes.
Id. at n3. The Court then held that an investigating officer may rely on a
flyer or bulletin from other Police Departments to justify an investigative
stop, but only "if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop." Id. at 232,
* * *

In allowing such reliance, the Court made a logical progression from its
decision fourteen years earlier in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971),
in which it determined the legality of an arrest based on radioed arrest
warrant information. The Whiteley court held that an officer can make a
valid arrest based on such broadcast information only if the department
issuing the information had sufficient probable cause to support the arrest
warrant. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568. By applying the Whiteley approach to
reasonable suspicion scenarios, the Hensley Court concluded that the
officer or department who issues a directive for investigation to other
police must have sufficient reasonable suspicion, through specific and
articulable facts, to support the stop. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232. Case, 884
P.2d at 1277 (emphasis added).
Therefore, the distinction between Case and the present matter is the existence of
articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion in the possession of the officer issuing
the directive for the stop. In Case, dispatcher did not have sufficient reasonable
suspicion for a stop when the radio transmission was made, whereas, in the present
matter Dunlap did have sufficient reasonable suspicion, by virtue of having witnessed
Defendant run the stop sign, when he made his transmission to Officer Russell.

8

II

ALTERNATIVELY, AGENT DUNLAP ACTED AS A RELIABLE
INFORMANT TO OFFICER RUSSELL IN FORMING REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO ALLOW OFFICER RUSSELL TO STOP THE
DEFENDANT.
The above analysis, including the reasoning in the United States Supreme Court,

in Hensley, suggest that peace officers enjoy a trustworthiness such that flyers, bulletins,
and information received from law enforcement are deemed reliable, and the only
question is whether articulable facts exist to support reasonable suspicion. Alternatively,
the State asserts that Agent Dunlap's dispatch to Officer Russell constitutes a citizeninformant's tip that is reliable and was based on reasonable suspicion.
Articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion usually are grounded in a peace
officer's personal perceptions and inferences, but in some cases an officer may rely upon
external information. Mulcahy, at 234. An officer receiving a dispatched message "may
take it at face value and act on it forthwith." Id. In such cases the key inquiry is whether
the State presented sufficient evidence to show that the dispatch relaying the tip was
based on reasonable suspicion. Id. To decide existence of articulable facts, the reliability
of the informant's tip is important.2 Id. Three factors are looked to in making this
determination: (1) the type of tip or informant involved, (2) whether the informant gave

2

The Defendant claims in his brief that the informant's reliability is immaterial as
he believes that failing to stop at a stop sign is not a crime. Appellant's Brief at 7.
Defendant however is mistaken. Utah Code §41-6-72.10 provides that the operator of a
vehicle must stop at the stop sign. Utah Code §41-6-12 makes the failure to stop at a
stop sign a Class C Misdemeanor.
9

enough detail about the observed criminal activity, and (3) whether the police officer's
personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report.
First, an identified "citizen-informant" is high on the reliability scale and needs no
"independent proof of reliability or veracity." Id. Like a citizen informer, an identified
police officer is high on the reliability scale. A police officer's job depends on his ability
to accurately and truthfully report his observations. A police officer is subject to criminal
prosecution if he is found to have misrepresented the truth. Also, a police officer is
trained to notice details related to criminal activity. In the case at bar, Agent Dunlap
personally spoke with Officer Russell over the police radio, thereby identifying himself
as a peace officer to Officer Russell.
Second, Agent Dunlap gave sufficient detail about the observed criminal activity
to support the stop. Agent Dunlap communicated over his police radio that the defendant
did not stop at the stop sign at the intersection. As it relates to the crime of Failure to
Stop at a Stop Sign, this brief communication that he personally observed the defendant
fail to stop at the sign provided Officer Russell sufficient detail of criminal activity to
stop the defendant.
Third, Officer Russell's personal observations confirmed the dispatcher's tip and
Agent Dunlap's observations. "The officer may corroborate the tip either by observing
the illegal activity or by finding the person, the vehicle and the location substantially as
described by the informant." Id. at 236. Officer Russell responded to the dispatch call

10

regarding a suspicious old green truck. He then engaged in a radio conversation wherein
Agent Dunlap advised Officer Russell that he was following a truck matching that
description, and that the same truck had ran a stop sign in Agent Dunlap's presence.
Officer Russell then corroborated this information by seeing the old green truck on the
same road on which Agent Dunlap reported he was following the truck, and also saw
Agent Dunlap in his vehicle making pursuit. As Officer Russell saw the green truck, in
the reported location, with the reporting officer pursuing the truck, Russell had sufficient
corroboration that the old green truck he saw was the same truck that ran the stop sign in
violation of Utah law.
Therefore, as Agent Dunlap identified himself to Officer Russell, explained that
the defendant had committed a crime in his presence, and Officer Russell corroborated
Agent Dunlap's tip, Officer Russell was justified in stopping the defendant.
Furthermore, there was reasoanble suspicion (in fact, probable cause), that the Defendant
had committed a public offense and Officer Russell lawfully stopped the defendant.
CONCLUSION
Agent Dunlap communicated reasonable suspicion regarding a public offense to
Officer Russell. Whether the communication was made as a peace officer or as a reliable
citizen-informant, Russell lawfully stopped the defendant based on reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity. For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed.
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